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The EU is not the first supranational organisation to 
establish structured relations with civil society – the United 
Nations, the Council of Europe or the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have all 
established fora of civil society interaction –, nor the first 
polity to try to address its problems of legitimacy by 
institutionalising mechanisms of citizen participation. Calls 
to reinvigorate representative democracy by strengthening 
direct participation are topical since the 1970s. However, 
the EU is the only supranational institution to have used the 
notions of participatory democracy and to have created 
mechanisms allowing for individual citizens' direct 
participation in policy-making in addition to dialogue with 
civil society.  This paper reviews the agenda on participation 
in the last 15 years in its first section, attempts to 
conceptualise the evolving goals and limited results the EU 
has sought in section two and provides some ideas for 
bringing the focus towards what these mechanisms can 
actually produce in section three.  
And yet the assessments of civil society organisations and the 
academics interested in participatory democracy at the EU 
level are far from positive, and not very optimistic with regard 
to the future. Their criticisms can be summarised in three 
main arguments: (i) the participation mechanisms are too 
weak to offer real opportunities to influence debates, (ii) 
these mechanisms are elitist in nature and unable to reach 
beyond the ‘Brussels policy bubble’, and (iii) the 
implementation of the mechanisms has lost momentum 
since the agenda peaked in the years between the demise of 
the Santer Commission (1999) and the adoption of the 
European Constitutional Treaty (2005), which was never 
ratified. The best evidence of the weakness of the 
participatory agenda lies in the fact that despite the increased 
attention to and contention on EU affairs during the euro-
crisis the participatory mechanisms have not served to launch 
a significant debate on policy alternatives to austerity, not to 
say formulate credible alternatives. 
Participatory mechanisms: institutionalisation without 
implementation? 
The EU has had more or less established relations with 
interest groups since its creation in the 1950s and the 
institutions have found allies in these organisations when it 
came to extending the EU’s competences. However, it was 
Executive Summary 
> The EU is the first supranational organisation to 
have attempted to use participatory democracy 
mechanisms to engage its citizens, but these 
mechanisms have failed to channel the 
dissatisfaction with the management of the euro 
crisis. 
> The institutional attention shifted from an original 
emphasis on focused dialogue with a reduced 
number of civil society organisations to an attempt 
to engage with more actors and use all 
mechanisms to communicate after the failure of 
the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005. 
> Despite some achievements, both approaches 
have fallen short of ambition. Civil society 
dialogues have not been able to associate national 
and individual members of the organisations, 
whereas new approaches like the European 
Citizens’ Initiative fail to create sufficient public 
attention. 
> Before giving up on participatory mechanisms 
altogether, the EU could try to establish a stronger 
relation between direct dialogue with 
organisations and an evaluation of their role in the 
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only in the 1990s that the Commission launched a reflection 
on its relation with interest groups and on how these groups 
could be a proxy for direct contact with European institutions. 
It is not a surprise that these reflections coincided with two 
key instances of the EU’s democratic legitimacy problems: 
the first popular rejection of the Maastricht Treaty in a 
referendum in Denmark and perceptions of 
maladministration following the resignation of the Santer 
Commission in 1999.  
In the 15 years since the 2001 White Paper on Governance 
there have been incremental attempts to transform 
organised civil society input into policy-making into a form of 
participatory democracy or interactive policy-making. The 
goals have been to re-balance the playing field among 
representatives of different interests, increase the 
transparency of policy-making, provide citizens with 
opportunities of contact with and influence on policy-makers, 
increase the quality of policy-making and foster a pan-
European debate on European policy alternatives. Article 11 
TEU has been considered as the confirmation of this strategy, 
since it entitles citizens to exchange views on the EU (art 
11.1), stipulates dialogue between institutions and civil 
society (art 11.2), stakeholders consultation before policy 
proposals are made by the Commission (art 11.3) and calls for 
citizens participation in policy initiation (art 11.4). However, 
the narrative on the design of a participatory strategy by the 
institutions needs to be challenged, as the adoption of the 
concrete participation instruments is not directly related to 
the adoption of the Treaty article, highlighting the 
incremental nature of this agenda.  
The European Commission mentioned participatory 
democracy for the first time in a 2000 policy consultation on 
a stronger partnership with NGOs, followed by the White 
Paper on Governance (which provides a general framework 
and strategic orientation on how to bring the EU closer to the 
citizens) and the 2002 Guidelines on dialogue and 
consultation. This 2002 Communication, together with the 
series of ‘better regulation packages’ launched in 2005 and 
updated in subsequent communications, is still the reference 
document on the ways in which policy dialogue with civil 
society and stakeholders is organised, stating which 
proposals must be open to consultation or deadlines for 
reply. In this context, the 2004 Constitutional Treaty included 
article 47 under the heading ‘Participatory Democracy’. After 
the 2005 rejection of the Treaty, the article was turned into 
article 11 TEU in the Lisbon Treaty with the same phrasing 
except that the ‘Participatory Democracy’ title was dropped.  
The aftermath of the failure of the Constitutional Treaty 
illustrated that the participation agenda is not the result of a 
masterplan derived from the Treaty. In 2006 the Commission 
launched a transparency initiative whose most salient aspect 
is a register of lobby groups. The register was reformed in 
2011 and it is currently under review in order to discuss 
whether registration should be mandatory instead of 
voluntary. Since 2007, the Commission  and the European 
Parliament engaged in the ‘Europe for citizens’ programme, 
inspired by the reflection following the failed referenda and 
which aimed among other things to use participation 
opportunities to communicate on Europe. In 2011, the EU 
regulated the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI), allowing 1 
million citizens to request the Commission to initiate 
legislation. 
A change in the focus of participation 
The regulation of the ECI in 2011 is the confirmation that the 
agenda on participation has changed since its inception 
between 2000 and 2004. Whereas, as mentioned above, the 
Treaty has four provisions, the EU has only acted explicitly 
upon art. 11.4 on the ECI. When it comes to the provisions for 
dialogue with civil society - the core of the original strategy - 
the attitude of the institutions is that the actions mandated 
by the Treaty are already in force and thus no further action 
on precepts 1 to 3 in art 11 TUE - referring to dialogue with 
citizens, civil society and stakeholder consultation - is 
necessary. However, this argument has some significant 
limitations. Whereas the Commission may argue that it has a 
policy for stakeholder consultation and a dialogue with civil 
society carried out at the DG level, the organisations that 
promoted the institutionalisation of these practices such as 
the Social Platform consider that a horizontal civil dialogue - 
a general dialogue with high ranking officials on top of policy-
specific consultation - is lacking. As the European Economic 
and Social Committee has indicated regularly since 2009, art 
11.2 seems to mandate all EU institutions to establish 
dialogues with civil society, and this is far from achieved: the 
Parliament has irregular contacts - even though it has evolved 
from sceptical positions seeing civil society participation in 
competition with its representative role -  and the Council has 
no policy on this matter.  
The disinterest for the precept on dialogue with civil society 
since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty is further proof 
that the EU agenda on participation has lost ground. This 
stands in contrast to the recent attention devoted to the 
reviews of the transparency register (2016) and the 
regulation (2011) and the review of the ECI (2015). Indeed, it 
rather seems that the agenda on participation is being 
reformulated: the attention has moved away from dialogue 
with EU-level civil society to mechanisms favouring the 
participation of a wider range of organisations, interests and 
citizens, and potentially contributing to a wider attention of 
the public. 
This turn must be understood with reference to the 
evaluation of the effects of participation as implemented 
since 2000. Participation was incrementally built on existing 
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relations with organised civil society and lobby groups in the 
assumption that in the absence of a public sphere these 
organisations could act as a proxy for the preferences of the 
European publics. The consequence was that EU policy 
consultations provided incentives for the participation of 
organisations with a good record of involvement and 
expertise in EU matters rather than those able to consult their 
own members or to articulate campaigns or raising 
awareness. This is the result of institutional factors - short 
consultation deadlines, notions of representativeness 
emphasising pan-European membership - and the high 
degree of competition in the pluralistic EU policy-making, 
which enhances a type of reputation  requiring a long term 
involvement in the European field and a strong technical 
capacity.  
Whereas this system contributes to achieve a fairer 
equilibrium of interests - civil society groups can balance 
business organisations even with fewer resources - the 
debate on the European Constitution provided evidence of its 
limits in enhancing better knowledge and ownership of EU 
policy-making by ordinary citizens, as the organisations that 
achieved influence in the Constitutions were not heard 
during debates on the ratification of the Treaty. The ‘Europe 
for citizens’ programme is directly related to the reflection 
plan D launched by the Commission in the aftermath of the 
French and Dutch referenda. This document proposed for the 
first time to coordinate civil society consultation and the 
communication agenda and also considered for the first time 
consulting national organisations. All the subsequent policy 
instruments (such as the better regulation packages, the 
transparency initiatives and the regulation of the ECI) have 
moved away from semi-corporatist inspirations of civil 
dialogue with a small group of well-informed and 
representative organisations to emphasise that EU 
institutions should be accessible to all types of organised 
interests, stakeholders and individuals. Visible steps in these 
directions have been the increased usage of open online 
consultation including questionnaires for individuals (in 
opposition to dialogue with focused organisations), the 
creation of a lobbying transparency register that is open to 
individuals and national organisations on the condition that 
they declare their interests and funding - implying that there 
are no checks on "Europeanness" or representativeness - and 
the regulation of the European Citizens’ Initiative whereby a 
group of seven citizens can ask the Commission to act on a 
policy proposal if they collect the signatures of one million 
citizens. It is important to note that the Commission took 
pride in launching the regulation of the ECI it as one of the 
first offsprings of the Lisbon Treaty whereas it has not acted 
on paragraphs 11.1, 11.2 and 11.3, which confirms the new 
orientation of the participatory agenda.  
There is thus a clear evolution from a ‘closed’ system 
emphasising representation and expertise to an ‘open’ one 
stressing transparency, diversity and communication. 
However ‘participatory democracy 2.0’ as enforced since the 
late 2000s does not seem to have achieved much either. First, 
online policy consultations have not overcome some of the 
well-established biases in EU policy-making - the presence of 
more business organisations and groups from Northern 
Europe than civil society groups and Southern European 
organisations. Second, the transparency register has created 
tensions of its own such as the evidence provided by a bogus 
registration in 2012 that showed that entries were not 
properly checked, followed by the debate about its status 
since it emerged as a voluntary register in 2006. The 
Commission is only considering mandatory registration after 
its third review in 2016. Finally, the European citizens’ 
initiative is failing on its promise to make EU policy-making 
more accessible to ordinary, individual citizens. In its four 
years of existence more than 50 initiatives were launched, 
only 31 registered - the others being considered as outside 
the Treaty - and only three met the one million signatures 
threshold. Furthermore, the promoters of two of these 
initiatives were highly disappointed with the policy response 
to their proposals, with one of them even going to the 
European Court of Justice to seek for redress. Even more, not 
only is the ECI failing to achieve policy influence, but its usage 
is dramatically dropping over time, as every year since 2012 
has seen fewer proposals than the previous ones. 
Design a policy oriented to the public sphere by 
coordinating existing mechanisms 
It clearly appears that participatory instruments have not met 
their ambitious objectives. However it would be a paradox 
that the EU - an early promoter of participation - would 
simply abandon opportunities for citizens’ direct input into 
policy-making at a time when the EU project is more 
contested and when citizens - especially younger ones - 
demand new forms of political participation.  
The incremental development of participatory mechanisms 
has created a two-tier system: on the one hand, the 
institutions wish to maintain close contacts with 
organisations that can provide state-of-the-art expertise that 
is formulated as feasible EU policies, whereas on the other 
hand they wish to keep the channels of participation open. 
Political capital and initiative seem to have moved from the 
first to the second, but both stay in place. However, the full 
potential of these mechanisms could actually be realised by 
attempting to combine both tiers. 
Before attempting any reforms it would be important to 
avoid an inflation in the terminology and be clear about the 
real potential of these mechanisms. They are not a form of 
direct democracy as they give citizens no say about the 
results, but rather modest mechanisms of involvement in 
agenda-setting. They do however have a potential to diversify 
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the number of points of view, bring new issues onto the 
agenda, increase the transparency of the policy process and 
foster pan-European campaigns. 
The achievement of these goods is limited by the current 
configuration. The ECI has a strong potential to bring issues 
to the agenda and eventually politicise some debates. Yet, 
some of the most controversial issues - prostitution, abortion, 
regional secessionism - have been averted or not directly 
addressed. The ECI also does have potential to diversify the 
type of civil society actors and campaigns since signature 
collection is more feasible for actors which are not necessarily 
so strongly involved in EU affairs.  
One of the ways in which civil society involvement could be 
made more participatory, diverse and vibrant would be by 
establishing linkages between an involvement in direct 
dialogue with the institutions and the usage of mobilisation 
tools such as the ECI. In fact this is what the ECI regulation 
somehow attempted by giving successful ECI promoters a 
right to be heard in the European Parliament - a hearing 
which, as recently suggested by the European Ombudsman, 
could be held together with the Council in fulfilment of the 
general predicament of article 11 TEU. In addition to this, the 
institutions could consider measuring the social 
representativeness of causes or organisations involved in civil 
dialogue by assessing how often they take part in ECIs or 
other forms of awareness-raising. This would give the 
Brussels-based organisations strong incentives to reach out in 
support for their campaigns. 
Participatory democracy in the EU has not achieved its goals, 
and yet it remains one of the clearest attempts to involve 
citizens directly in policy making. The principle is not obsolete 
yet, but the consistent focus of civil society and the 
institutions on these mechanisms seems more obstinate than 
results oriented. The suggestions made above are compatible 
with the incremental approach taken so far and require few 
or no new regulations. They however depart from it by 
pointing out that instead of presenting contacts with civil 
society as a genuine form of participatory democracy they 
take a more modest step of recognising that there is a deficit 
of diversity and controversy in policy-making and design 
opportunities fostering new debates and associating new 
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